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Abstract
The past two decades have witnessed the proliferation of funding mechanisms
by which to deliver international aid to distressed countries, albeit few aid initiatives paid particular attention to the delivery and management through the bypassing of state machineries. This article sets out to show that the use of intergovernmental trust funds has the potential of transforming the aid (broadly understood) landscape and, while being intrusive, harness local corruption and mismanagement. Effectively, such trust vehicles, would function as oversight,
management, and disbursement mechanisms, on the basis of human rights-based
approaches to development, and enhance local ownership and democratic values
and principles. The Chadian model discussed in this paper is an excellent case
study because, although it ultimately failed to live up to its developmental expectations, it was a significant attempt by which to efficiently deliver aid, enhance
capacity and self-determination.
1.

Introduction

There is by now a considerable body of practice whereby international trust
funds are established to channel, deliver and manage international aid-related
assets. t Trust funds of this nature are based on a tripartite relationship, namely
one or more donors, a trustee, and future beneficiaries. The difference with do3
mestic notions of trusts, 2 or the equivalent in the Islamic tradition (awqaf), is
that the relationship between the donor and trustee is contractual and the beneficiaries have no right of action against the donor or the trustee. The trustee is
4
typically an inter-governmental organisation, such as the World Bank, or the
Professor of Law, Hamad bin Khalifa University (Qatar Foundation), College of Law and Ad*
junct Professor, Georgetown University, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service.
I See generally, Ilias Bantekas, The Emergence of Intergovernmental Trusts in International Law,
81 BRITISH Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 224 (2011).
2 Clearly, inter-governmental trusts have been modeled on their domestic counterparts and are effectively creatures of comparative law as applied to their inter-state context; See Maurizio Lupoi, TRUSTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Simon Dix trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000); Adeline Chong, The Common
Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts, 54 INT'L AND COMP. L. Q. 855 (2005);
Adair Dyer, InternationalRecognition and Adaptation of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention,
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 990 (1999).
3 Haitam Suleiman, The Islamic Trust Waqf: A Stagnant or Reviving Legal Institution?, 4 ELEC. J.
OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN L. 27 (2016).
4 World Bank, Trust Funds Annual Report (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
(The
428511521809720471/pdf/124547-REVISED-PUBLIC-17045-TF-Annual-Report-web-Aprl7.pdf.
Bank's key instrument for managing trusts is its IBRD Operational Policy (OP) 14,40 (Jan 1997, as
revised in 2013) on Trust Funds.)
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United Nations, who manages the assets provided by the donors and disburses
said assets, 5 as agreed with the donors, to a class of named beneficiaries. 6 Depending on the size of its assets, which may well be replenished through regular
donor conferences, the trust fund may require a more elaborate corporate governance mechanism. Several trusts have eventually moved from mere bank accounts
of the trustee to fully blown intergovernmental organizations. 7
For the purposes of anti-corruption, the trust model provides a significant
mechanism to avoid corruption in the host state. Typically, foreign aid, or aidrelated funding was channeled to the target/host state and it was the latter that
was charged with the delivery and implementation of the objectives set out by the
donors.8 This model has proven to be a failure because, in the vast majority of
cases, the state mechanism was not only unable to manage the assets, but it was
subject to the corrupt practices of senior and mid-level officials. Trust funds are
predicated on a different structure altogether. The donors authorize the trustee
who, as an international organisation, enjoys privileges and immunities in the
target state. If it does not, it can enter into an ad hoc headquarters (HQ) agreement to that effect with the target state. In this manner, the assets under consideration will be inviolable and not subject to the control or manipulation of the
target state. 9 The trustee can then get on with the tasks entrusted to it and disburse the trust's assets. The HQ agreement' 0 ensures that the trustee will not be
accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of the target state, which would
otherwise be the case if the trustee were to make random disbursements to beneficiaries without the consent of the target state, on the basis of the principle of
local ownership. 1 Where none of the assets pass through the official channels of
5 Global Fund Donors Pledge US $14 Billion in Fight to End Epidemics, THE; GLOBAL FUND (Oct.
10, 2019), https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/specials/2019-10-09-global-fund-sixth-replenishment-conference/ (By late 2019 the total amount of funds committed by donors to the Global Fund were USD 14
billion).
6 Nele Matz, Environmental Financing:Function and Coherence of FinancialMechanisms in International Environmental Agreements, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 473 (2002).
7 Ilias Bantekas, The Legal Personalityof World Bank Funds under InternationalLaw, TUILsA L.R.
(forthcoming 2021).
8 In 2016, an updated standardized Administration Agreement template with sixteen of the World
Bank's largest donors who provide 90 percent of IBRD/IDA trust fund resources was adopted, including
standard provisions on disclosure of information and communication on fiduciary issues. This was supplemented with a series of notes on governance arrangements in trust funds, preferencing arrangements,
donor reporting, managing trust funds for results, and indicative budgets. Bhuvan Bhatnagar, et. al., 2017
Trust Fund Annual Report, WORLD BANK GROUP, 152 (March 3, 2018), http://www.worldbank.org/en/
publication/trust-fund-annual-report-2017.
9 Bantekas, supra note 1 at 264.
10 Id. at 267-68.

11 Section VI(A)(1) - (3) of the Framework Document of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, states that the Fund will base its work on programs that reflect "national ownership and respect
country partnership-led formulation and implementation processes. . . . The Fund will promote partnerships among all relevant players within the country, and across all sectors of society. It will build on
existing coordination mechanisms and promote new and innovative partnerships where none exist". More
importantly, subsection B(1) clarifies that the "Fund will work with a country coordination and partnership mechanism that should include broad representation from governments, NGOs, civil society, multilateral and bilateral agencies and the private sector". Equally, in accordance with subsection B(7)(a), the
Fund will consider proposals, among others, from "countries that suppress or have not established part2
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the government or institutions of the target state, the risk of corruption at the
higher and mid-tier levels of government is necessarily avoided. The trust can
also ensure that the beneficiaries are worthy of funding and hence eliminate state
actors disguised as beneficiaries. No doubt, the trust model cannot ultimately
ensure that the target state will not intimidate or coerce beneficiaries from using
assets bestowed upon them; but in the event of such corruption it can freeze the
flow of any further funds and set out new conditions.
This article examines effective fiscal management of international aid by looking at the anti-corruption potential of trust funds, followed by an analysis of the
impact of trusts on revenue sharing, which has been crucial in disputes between
elites and regional communities. The Chadian example, with its highs and lows,
will serve as a paradigm about how the trust mechanism can produce positive
impact, while at the same time using its negative experiences to highlight particular governance issues. The Chadian case is important, although it was initiated
more than a decade ago, for at least two reasons: first, it was and still is one of
the few cases where a fiscal issue crucial to the budgetary existence of a state
was taken out of its hands almost entirely, thus leading to a significant loss of
sovereignty-this is not the case with the vast majority of trust mechanisms;
second, this is the only known case study where a large portion of the fiscal
affairs of a state were effectively managed by an external entity with the aim of
dispensing fundamental human rights in the target state. While other mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting, 12 exist elsewhere, they are wholly local in
character, and the central state is by no means bypassed.
2.

The Anti-Corruption Potential of Trust Funds

One of the key aims of trust funds is to disengage the dependency of foreign
aid and foreign assistance from the clutches of those governments that are not
subject to fiscal and other forms of transparency. The entire rationale of the international trust concept is founded around this observation. Indeed, both the IMF
and the IBRD, as well as individual donor states, are not only reluctant but in
fact, refuse to provide funds to countries without certain fundamental guarantees. 3 For this reason, they enter into agreements with borrowing states, even if
they are already members, by which the World Bank, particularly, demands legislative and structural changes to a country's economy and fiscal management.
Conditions of this nature were incorporated in the IMF's agreements with Hungary and the Ukraine following their financial downfall in the wake of the 2008
nerships with civil society and NGOs". THE GLOBAL FUND, The Framework Document, 94-96 (Feb.
2012); see also Andrew Friedman, Transitional Justice and Local Ownership: A Framework for the
Protection of Human Rights, 46 AKRON L.R. 727, (2013).
12 See BRIAN WAMPLER, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN BRAZIL: CONTESTATION, COOPERATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (3rd ed. 2010); Aaron Schneider & Ben Goldfrank, Budgets and Ballots in Brazil:
ParticipatoryBudgeting from the City to the State, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (2002).
13 See HOSSEIN NABILOU,

RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION (Ross

P.

Buckley et al. eds., 2016); See also Rosa M. Lastra, GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AND HUMAN

137 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavernie eds., 2016) (arguing that the IMF could recommend human rights reforms).

RIGHTS, IN MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 129,

sky & Jernej Letnar
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global recession and later on Greece. 1 4 Fiscal transparency breeds governmental
transparency and enhances civil society and public participation, thus making
government responsible to the people. It is by no means a one-off exercise, but an
entrenched cycle. Besides funding for the sake of financial independence, donor
states moreover promote a corruption-free state that can develop itself in a sustainable manner.
The Kiribati and Tuvalu trust funds are examples not only of financially dependent States achieving fiscal independence but also of states that have succeeded in attaining transparent governance.1 5 Article 20 of the 1987 Agreement
Concerning an International Trust Fund for Tuvalu reads as follows:
1) The government of Tuvalu shall treat all moneys received by it from
the Fund as public moneys of Tuvalu and as such subject to parliamentary
appropriation and scrutiny.
2) The government of Tuvalu shall on request provide full information

and documents to the Board and the Advisory Committee of and in relation to Tuvalu's National Budgets and estimates, the annual accounts and
the reports of the Auditor-General (including any information or docu-

ments which the Auditor-General would be entitled to demand) and financial, social and economic data held by the government of Tuvalu.
3) The government of Tuvalu shall ensure that the accounts of and [annual audit] reports relating to the Fund . . . are promptly laid before the
Parliament of Tuvalu.

6) The government of Tuvalu shall ensure that legislation is enacted and
maintained to give effect to obligations under paragraphs
Article.

1 to 3 of this

Articles 21 to 23 of the Agreement further establish a complex procedure for
independent audits, bookkeeping, and the furnishing of annual reports. Given that
the Fund's governance mechanism involves the participation of all contributing
states, a Board, an independent fund manager, an independent auditor, as well as
the Parliament of Tuvalu, the chances for corruption are naturally minimal.
Let us now examine three examples of trust funds whereby the lack of transparency through the imposition of a regime of confidentiality, or the lack of an
independent trustee, has given rise to accusations of corruption and misappropriation. The aim of this discussion is to determine the institutional shortcomings of
these trust funds as opposed to the relatively successful Tuvalu model. The majority of sovereign wealth funds-as well as natural resources stabilisation trust
14
15

See Ilias Bantekas & Renaud Vivien, On the Odiousness of Greek Debt, 22 EUR. L.J. 539 (2016).
1536 U.N.T.S. 48. The Tuvalu Trust Fund was founded in 1987, almost a decade following the
tiny island's independence, on the basis of a multilateral treaty between Tuvalu, New Zealand, Australia,
and the UK, and is expressly given the status of an international organization that of which is administered by a Board of Directors composed of representatives from the four contracting States in an equal
capacity, id. at 48-50.
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funds-in developing States prefer to subject trust funds, and their international
16
contractual relationships, with foreign investors to the regime of private, as
opposed to public, law. Were the trust fund and relevant transactions to be amenable to public law, the agreements and budgeting activities would require parliamentary scrutiny and approval and the passing of a public law of some kind,
7
which would have had to be published in the country's official gazette.1 On the
contrary, the privatisation of the State's finances and foreign investment activities (and hence the trust funds into which these moneys are deposited) means that
no public discussion or accountability is required.
An often-used justification in these cases relates to the principle of party autonomy in the law of contracts, whereby the parties may subject their contract to
8
a veil of confidentiality, whether absolute or partial.' It is often claimed that
contracts between State entities and private investors must necessarily be cloaked
under private law. A natural consequence following from absolute contract confidentiality relates to the lack of information about those State finances pertinent to
the contract. If the government decides by law that revenues are not to be made
public, then the next logical step is to avoid incorporating such revenues into the
annual State budget. Such revenues would either simply not exist, or because
they would not have been officially declared as oil monies (or other types of
revenues as the case may be) they could not be channeled into the regular budget,
but into an extraordinary budget! Given that there generally exist four types of
constitutional budgets, i.e. on the basis of appropriation, vote-on-account, voteof-credit and supplementary, an extraordinary budget of this kind that would not
be adopted publicly by parliament would be clearly unconstitutional. It is equally
unconstitutional - or a defiance of fundamental constitutional principles - for
parliament to adopt a secret, non-public, budget.19
16 KINNARI

I. BHATI, CONCESSIONAIRES, FINANCIERS AND COMMUNITY: IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS

IN TRANSNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, 91-122 (2020). A recurring
element is the emphasis on English law the governing law of most concession agreements, as well as the
involvement of international financial institutions (IFIs), either as facilitators of the project's finance or
guarantors. In any event, the World Bank Group imposes upon the concessionaire its Operational Policy
on Indigenous People, which includes catchy phrases derived from UN instruments, while at the same
time at the same time the financing aspects of the contract between the concessionaire and the host state
are subject to IFC private regulation standards, id.
PEOPLES'

RIGHTS TO LAND

17 ILAs BANTEKAS, SOVEREIGN DEBT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SOVEREIGN DEBT AND SELF-DErRMINA-

TION 267 (Ilias Bantekas & Cephas Lumina eds., 2018).
18 This is based on the rule of party autonomy. If the parties decided to set up, on the basis of a
private contract, an offshore trust or an offshore account, this would be subject to a veil of confidentiality. Indeed, the courts of all offshore jurisdictions (under express statutory terms) have held that such
confidentiality extends to the financial details of offshore trusts and that no subpoena request may compel
disclosure. See In re H (1996) C.I.L.R. 237 (Cayman Is.); Tele-Art Inc. v. Ming Kown Kooh (1997) 1
O.F.L.R. 870 (Virgin Is.). Disclosure is possible only under specified circumstances. Tournier v. Nat'l
Provincial Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461. These criteria are: that it is ordered under compulsion of the law; a
public interest must already be in existence; the disclosure must itself be in the interests of the banker;
and that it is performed with the consent of the client, see ROSE-MARE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 23 (1st ed. 2002).
19 IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLFITCAL WRrTINGS 93-130 (Han Reiss ed., 2nd ed. 1991) (citing Kant's
advocacy of the principle of publicity, in which all laws must be public so that they can be defensible and
serve as a measure of justice); JEREMY BENTHAM, PROMULGATION OF THE LAWS, IN THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1843) (stating that in order for a law to be obeyed it must be
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The creation of natural resources trust funds is a possible alternative, but such
funds are practically useless in countries like Kazakhstan, where production sharing agreements and joint venture contracts are confidential. The Kazakh National
Fund (NF), established by presidential decree in 2000,20 is both a stabilisation
and a savings fund that lacks the fundamental requirements of transparency because the production sharing agreements (PSAs), and joint venture agreements
adopted between Kazakhstan and foreign investors are not open to public scrutiny. 2 1 The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), established by Presidential
Decree No. 240 of 29 December 1999, is directed towards sterilising foreign
currency earned from oil and gas revenues; but it serves as a savings fund where
the primary is invested and not used as a lending pot or as collateral for government debts, in accordance with the Fund's Regulations. 22 According to its Regulations, the Fund is to manage its assets in the interests of the Azeri people and
their future generations. This mandate includes also expenditures related to the
socio-economic progress of the country, the construction of necessary infrastructure, and other works or projects in respect of 'the most important nation-wide
problems'. 23 Despite the existence of these explicit directives, SOFAZ has not
formulated a clear policy or criteria as to investment priorities or the promotion
of non-oil social development. Decisions are usually adopted on an ad hoc basis
and have included expenditures connected to internally displaced persons
through the promulgation of presidential decrees. 24 Failure to diversify the local
economy, increased reliance on oil revenues, and lack of independent oversight
and control have resulted in the usurpation of the Fund's earnings to finance the
government's share of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Although the IMF
initially disagreed with the use of Fund money to finance an oil-sector project as
being contrary to SOFAZ asset management rules, which itself designed and
made conditional in order to grant a loan to Azerbaijan through its Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), it later posed no further problems. 2 5
Unlike SOFAZ and the Kazakh National Fund, the Chad trust fund, discussed
above in sections 3.1 and 3.3.1, was not designed to be susceptible to the limitations of private law and hence to a regime of confidentiality. Rather, it was meant
to be transparent and two independent bodies were established to oversee its operations and fiscal management. Notwithstanding some notable successes, the
Chad trust fund failed to deliver its full potential, while its assets were routinely
known); See also Bantekas, supra note 17 (discussing how the Greek Constitution was effectively bypassed through the adoption of confidential agreements and memoranda of understanding).
20 Decree No. 402, Aug. 23, 2000 (Kaz).
21 SvI;rLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN Or. WINDFALLS: WHO WILL BENZarr? 127-207 (Robert
Ebel ed.,
2003).
22 Decree No. 240, Dec. 29, 1999 (Azer.) (including the addendums and amendments according to
the Decrees of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 849, No. 202, No. 216, No. 473, and No.
477).
23 See Id. at art. 4 1 3.
24 See TSALIK, supra note 21 at 112.
25 Id. at 113; see also, Ilias Banktekas, Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Schemes (Trust Funds) in
InternationalLaw, 52 NETH. INT'L L. Riev. 31 (2005); see also, ILAs BANKTEKAS, INHERENT TENSIONS
BETWEEN NATIONAL RESOURCES CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINABLI.

6

DEVELoPMNT (2007).

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 17, Issue 1

Effective Management of International Aid

appropriated by the government. Equally, many of the initial targets set out were
not at all implemented. Unlike SOFAZ and the Kazakh Fund, the Chad model
did involve the active participation of external actors, but only because this was
externally imposed on the government. Nonetheless, unlike the Tuvalu model,
none of the three other trust funds adhered to the practice of international trust
fund law, particularly that contemplating the existence of an independent trustee.
In respect of developing States and unstable or undemocratic regimes, the deposit
of trust assets in the hands of an independent trustee necessarily entails that said
assets will remain in the ownership of the trustee throughout the duration of the
trust's life cycle. This means that the incumbent government will be unable to
appropriate funds or make unilateral exceptions on the basis of its domestic law
or by invoking force majeure in order to escape from its contractual obligations
with the donors or the World Bank. It may be certainly countered that although
the management and disbursement of trust assets by an independent trustee satisfies demands for transparency and extinguishes the possibility of fiscal mismanagement, it, nonetheless, does not promote participatory governance and
democratic involvement. This is no doubt a valid observation that should not be
overlooked. An ideal trust model in respect of despotic regimes should involve
the following elements: a) the trust's assets should be in the ownership of an
independent trustee and not the target State; b) the governance structure of the
trust fund should involve the participation of the State's public apparatus, the
trustee, the contributing States, as well as elements from the opposition and civil
society on the basis either of observer status or in respect of the process of participatory budgeting, whichever the parties have agreed; c) the trustee, if an international financial institution, and the contributing States should placate in
contractual terms the responsibilities of the target State, as well as set out a number of conditions to be met. 26 In respect of the fund's budget it should be clear
that no unilateral amendments are possible; d) an external independent auditors
should be appointed and the obligation to produce annual financial reports should
be provided for in accordance with strict standards. Whereas the Bank imposes
rigid requirements on investors in relation to the environment and the financial
portion of the investment, the Bank's disclosure requirements are almost completely non-existent. Only 15% of the World Bank's extractive projects demand
full disclosure, while the majority do not. It is thus of little surprise that corruption is particularly rife in the extractive industries, especially because the rich oilproducing States in the developing world are governed by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. A requirement of full disclosure by the Bank vis-A-vis its investors
26 This may also include the obligation for the target State to adopt global or regional anti-corruption
treaties. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 LL.M 1 (1999); see also U.N. Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 334 (2000); see also United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004); see also G.A. Res. 3514 (XXX) (Dec. 15, 1974); see also
G.A. Res. 51/91 (Feb. 21, 1997); see also G.A. Res. 51/59 (Jan. 28, 1997); see also U.N. SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Guide for Anti-Corruption Policies, see also G.A. Res 46/261 116 (Apr. 15, 2002). Relevant are also Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 26, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1039, (1997); see
also African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 1, 2003. See also, Peter
W. Schroth, The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 49 J. Afr. L. 24
(2005).
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would go a long way in eradicating this scourge, and; e) the contributing parties
and the trustee must ensure that the target State does not abuse its authority following disbursement of assets to beneficiaries and following the commencement
of developmental projects. At this phase, the government may decide to use allocated assets for other purposes in contravention of the relevant disbursement
agreements. Hence, contractual terms must be potent enough to oppose infringements, and where they do occur they must provide for resilient action. As a result, it would once again be ideal if the disbursement process is linked to the
trust's terms of reference and assessed by an independent auditor under a quantifiable results-based scale. Equally, care should be taken so that disbursements are
paid out in tranches and not in the form of a single lump sum. Certainly, from a
political point of view, it will not always be feasible to incorporate such restrictive provisions with respect to the disbursement process and this is precisely why
the beneficiary must first satisfy that he is able and willing to use the funds for
the agreed purposes before a new disbursement is made. Irrespective of these
problems, however, it is evident beyond any doubt that a sound application of the
international trust model, under the terms identified above, may curb corruption
altogether and promote democratic governance.
3.

The Role of Trust Funds in Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Management

When international mediators approach rival and warring communities with a
view to pacifying the parties and restoring relations they focus on the particular
issues that caused the eruption of conflict. Where part, or all, of the problem lies
in the delimitation and distribution of natural resources between the various
groups, or where such matters may cause future conflicts, the mediators seek
ways in which the parties can agree to a fair formula for distribution. The problem becomes even more acute where it is linked to potential secession claims by
one of the parties, as is the case with the government of South Sudan and its
internationally recognised right and efforts toward external self-determination
from the Sudan. The underlying principle that has generally been applied to address such issues has been that of "equitable delimitation". The fundamental tenets of this principle are reflected in numerous international instruments, the
unifying theme of which is 'the recognition of rights of the parties to the use and
benefits of the international [natural resources] in question that are equal in principle and correlative in their application'. 2 7 In fact, most contemporary agreements go beyond the principle of equitable delimitation and utilization by
providing, in the case of watercourses, for integrated river-based management
through the establishment of competent specialized intergovernmental organizations. 28 This represents an excellent model for resolving disputes of this nature,
but these models are not susceptible to any form of participatory governance and
27 See G.A. Res. 49/52 (Feb. 17, 1995); see also U.N., Report of the InternationalLaw Commission
on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (May 2 - July 22, 1994).
28 See generally Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, May 19, 1978, 1089 U.N.T.S. 165; see also Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Niger Basin, Feb. 1, 1966, 587 U.N.T.S. 9;
see generally David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: Mere State
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once set up usually lack the overriding presence and authority of a trusted and
perpetual external actor, as would be the case with a trustee administering a trust
fund. This is not to say that the trust model constitutes the best mechanism in
every single case, but certainly where democracy in all its manifestations is lacking and corruption is rife, coupled with intense animosity between the parties, a
trusted third entity may well act as a good buffer zone.
Fiscal management, unlike revenue sharing in the context of internal conflict,
does not generally lend itself to external intervention and in any event, cannot be
subjected to the aforementioned model. The overarching principle of fiscal management is that fiscal systems must help manage and mitigate macroeconomic
instability and should distribute resources in an equitable and efficient manner.
Fiscal management becomes internationalized only where a State requests a significant injection of cash into its national economy, or where it requires a loan
from an international financial institution. In both cases, the lender or donor will
seek assurances that not only the loan will be repaid, but that, moreover, the
target State will agree to implement particular measures related to budgetary
management. Depending on circumstances the lender may also demand that the
distribution of resources take into consideration specific social projects and
groups. In this sense, loans or contributions of this nature entail an element of
conditionality. 2 9 Developing countries have long been, to various degrees, recipients of aid from their developed counterparts, as well as from international organisations. Aid comes in a plethora of forms, such as donations, debt-relief,
privileged trade treatment, privileged loans, and others. 30 Apart from those situations where aid is granted as a non-recoverable donation during urgent cases of
famine or natural catastrophes, all other forms of aid are contractual and are
usually accompanied by the imposition of so-called conditionalities on the recipient states. Such conditionality clauses vary in scope, some requiring minor obligations while others impose severe structural adjustment programs (SAP), which
have a significant impact on the recipient country's fiscal, monetary, legislative,
1
and political life, in both its internal and external relations. 3 The vast majority of
development and poverty alleviation loans have been provided by the IBRD and
IDA (as well as other regional international development banks), while the IMF
has entered into stand-by arrangements with IMF member States, which are exPractice or Customary International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 771 (1999) (an application of such agreements to hydrocarbon resources).
29 See SIGRUN

I.

SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTER-

NATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 23-26 (Cavendish 2001) (distinguishes between economic and political conditionality, arguing that the World Bank's Articles of Agreements preclude it from imposing the latter.
The same is not true for the IMF).
30 There are several indirect forms of debt relief. One of these is enhancing an otherwise heavily
indebted state's access to private financial markets through the creation by the World Bank of its PolicyBased Guarantee (PBG) program, that extends the Bank's existing PCG instrument to include sovereign
commercial borrowing in support of structural and social policy reforms, Udaibir S. Das, Michael G.
Papaioannou & Magdalena Polan, Strategic Considerations for First-Time Sovereign Bond Issuers
(I.M.F., Working Paper, Nov. 2008); see also CARLOS A. PRIMo BRAGA & DORTE DOMELAND, DEBT
RELIEF AND BEYOND: LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 313, 314-17 (World Bank, 2009).
31 See THOMAS STUBBS & ALEXANDER KENTIKELENIS, CONDITIONALITY AND SOVEREIGN DEBT: AN
OVERVIEw OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS (2018); see supra note 17 at 359, 369.
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pressly non-contractual in nature, or has alternatively made use of the special
facilities mentioned elsewhere in this book. Despite the absence of a contractual
nature in these arrangements, a significant amount of conditionality is present. 32
With the exception of the IBRD-Chad Agreement whereby an oil loan was made
conditional upon the mandatory allocation of oil revenues to social and development projects, no other explicit revenue-sharing agreements have ever been stipulated as a form of conditionality. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the
World Bank, argues that conditions imposed by the IMF cannot succeed because,
inter alia, they are resented by the local populations, they are designed by bureaucrats under a one-size-fits-all scheme with little concern for immediate social
repercussions, and in any event, they defeat the economic notion of 'fungibility';
that is, money going in for one purpose frees up money for another purpose. 33
Certainly, where conditions are imposed in the manner described by Stiglitz they
can cause more damage than benefit, but where human rights considerations,
such as revenue sharing, can be tangibly assessed and are relatively precise there
is no reason why they cannot bring the desired results.
Whereas conditionality arrangements are better known for their incorporation
in aid treaties, 34 recent practice demonstrates a trend, albeit marginal, according
to which a tacit form of conditionality is encompassed into loan agreements with
the World Bank with a specific focus on fiscal management. For this purpose, we
shall be examining as a case study the Chad Oil Revenue Management Plan,
because the World Bank imposed on the government of Chad the creation of a
trust fund with external monitoring in order to better manage and distribute the
royalties accruing from its fledgling oil exploration and pipeline transportation. 3 5

32 See generally ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POI.ICY or IMF CONDrIIONALITY (Kluwer Law International 1996) (the IMF adopted a new set of Guidelines on Conditionality in 2002. On 8 May 2003 the
IMF adopted a note entitled "Operational Guidelines on the New Staff Conditionality Guidelines").

33 J.E. STIGLrrz, GLOBALIZATION AND rrs DISCONTFNrs, 44-46 (Norton, 2003). The author uses the
example of a country that wants to construct a road for rural farmers to carry their produce and another
road for the president to travel to his weekend retreat, but money exists for only one of these. Id. at 44.
The condition imposed by the loan obliges the government to construct the rural road, but this in turn
frees local funds in order to construct the presidential road. Id.

34 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of
States of One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other Part, art. 9, June
23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L317) [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement]; Karin Arts, ACP-EU Relations in a New
Era: The Cotonou Agreement, 40 COM. MARK. L. REv. 95 (2003) ("In the context of a political and
institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good
governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial
resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making
procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law
in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing
measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption.").
35 Co-operation in resource allocation and management is stipulated in Art 24(c) of the Cotonou
Agreement, accompanied also by significant safeguards regarding social participation and public consultation. Nonetheless, it does not envision an external monitoring or enforcement mechanism, save from
the EC's right to invalidate its contribution (Arts 96 and 97) in those cases where the recipient violates
the terms of the Agreement, id. at art. 24(c), 96-97.

10

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 17, Issue

1

Effective Management of International Aid

3.1 Fiscal Management Trust Funds: The World Bank-Imposed Chad Oil
Revenue Management Plan
Chad is not a major oil producer by international standards. Yet, the projected
$200 US million annual earnings from its oil fields in the Doba Basin - since the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline became operational in 2004 - are double the country's
current revenues; in the meantime, further explorations revealed the existence of
more hydrocarbon deposits. The consortium of oil companies involved in the
Chad part of the project was apprehensive about their future image and standing,
particularly because the country has been run by a brutal dictatorship since 1990,
poverty was and continues to be widespread, corruption is rampant and all sense
36
of government and management were totally absent. They, therefore, turned to
the World Bank, firstly in order to secure the appropriate political guarantees
before going ahead with the project and secondly because they believed that the
Bank possessed the necessary authority to impose a revenue management plan
37
that would avert corruption and misappropriation. The World Bank Group proceeded to provide $115 million towards financing the project, a sum which represents 3% of the entire amount spent, but more importantly, it linked absorption of
this money and future project financing, among other conditions, to the development of a successful petroleum revenue management plan through its principal
38
Loan Agreement with the government of Chad. In fact, the Bank approved for
this purpose two specific loans: a) a Petroleum Sector Management Capacity
40
Building Project, 39 and b) Management of the Petroleum Economy. Whereas
the aim of the former was to strengthen Chad's capacity to manage the development of and increase the use of its petroleum resources in an environmentally and
socially sound manner, the Petroleum Economy Credit assisted the borrower, i.e.
Chad, 'in building capacity to implement its petroleum revenue management
strategy to enable it to effectively absorb and allocate expected oil revenue and
thus pursue the poverty-reduction objective of petroleum resources development'.41 The Loan Agreement envisaged the establishment of two distinct vehicles, one of which was a trust fund, the Future Generations Fund, to which 10
percent of petroleum royalties and dividends were to be deposited and invested in
long-term investment instruments with a financial institution, all of which were
36 Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not to Lend: Oil, Human Rights and the World Bank's
Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. Hum. R-s. J. 197, 218-222 (2001).
37 See Uriz, supra note 36, at 224. (citing Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies and
Institutional Weaknesses (Oct. 1999) (unpublished briefing paper)).
38 Legal Dept of World Bank. 2001. Conformed Copy - L4558 - Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project - ProjectAgreement 1 (English). Washington, D.C.:World Bank Group. [hereinafter IBRDChad Loan Agreement].
39 Legal Dept of World Bank. 2000. Conformed Copy - C3373 - Petroleum Sector Management
(English). Washington, D.C.:World Bank
Capacity-BuildingProject - Development Credit Agreement
8
Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/666 71468236367788/Conformed-Copy-C3373-Petroleum-Sector-Management-Capacity-Building-Project-Development-Credit-Agreement.
40 Legal Dept. of World Bank. 2000. Conformed Copy - C3316 - Management of the Petroleum
Economy Project-Development Credit Agreement (English). Washington, D.C. World Bank Group.
41

Id. at 14.
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to be accomplished to the satisfaction of the World Bank itself.4 2 The second
vehicle was a Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts, which would benefit from
90 percent of royalties and dividends deposited in special accounts in one or
more private commercial banks in Chad in the name of Chad's treasury; this
arrangement similarly required the World Bank's final approval. 43
The government of Chad was obliged under the terms of the agreement to
invest the assets of the Future Generations Fund in accordance with prudential
rules and investment arrangements satisfactory to the World Bank, in long-term
investment instruments. Upon liquidation, the proceeds of such investments were
to be used to benefit and finance poverty reduction objectives.4 4 Money deposited in the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts, on the other hand, was to be
allocated as follows:
i) 80 percent of royalties and 85 percent of dividends shall be allocated to
expenditures, acceptable to the [World] Bank, for the following priority
poverty reduction sectors in support of the Borrower's objective of regional balance: health and social affairs, education, infrastructure, rural

development (agriculture and livestock) and environment and water
resources.
ii) Expenditures to be financed with the royalties and dividends referred
to in [the previous paragraph] in these priority poverty reduction sectors
shall be incremental to expenditures reflected in the Borrower's budget
for fiscal year 2002 in respect of these sectors.
iii) 5 percent of royalties shall be allocated to decentralised authorities in
the petroleum-producing region, as a supplement referred to in paragraph
4(b)(i) above, to finance expenditures, acceptable to the Bank, to reduce
poverty ...
iv) Up to and including December 31, 2007, 15 percent of royalties and

dividends can be used to finance general recurrent expenditures for the
non "sovereign" sectors. After December 31, 2007, this portion shall be
used to finance expenditures in priority poverty reduction sectors referred
to in paragraph 4(b)(i) above in accordance with the same terms and conditions applicable to expenditures under such paragraph. 4 5

Moreover, the taxes collected from the investors were to be used to finance increased development expenditures generally. 46 The poverty reduction sectors
were understandably given increased attention and the particular modalities for
bringing it about were clearly outlined as follows:
42 IBRD-Chad Loan Agreement, supra note 38, at art.3(a).
43 Id. at art.3(b).
44 Id. at art. 4(a).
45 Id. at art. 4(b).
46 Id. at art. 4(c).

12

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 17, Issue

1

Effective Management of International Aid
i) By no later than September 15 each year, the Borrower shall prepare a
plan satisfactory to the Bank containing the detailed allocation of resources under paragraph 4(b)(i) from the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts to the priority poverty reduction sectors referred to in such
paragraph; such annual expenditure program shall be reflected in the draft
Borrower's budget to be submitted annually for approval to the Borrower's parliament.
ii) In accordance with Article 18 of the Petroleum Revenue Management
Law, the independent "College de Controle et de Surveillance des Resources Petrolieres" (CCSRP) shall authorise and verify the disbursements from the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts.
iii) Amounts under paragraph 4(b)(i) above which cannot be used for the
agreed objectives, or the use of which would jeopardise the Borrower's
macroeconomic liability, shall be held in the Special Petroleum Revenue
Accounts, under arrangements to be agreed upon by the [World] Bank,
for their subsequent use in financing priority poverty reduction sectors
referred to in paragraph 4(b)(i) above. 4 7

Prior to the adoption of the Loan Agreement, the government of Chad had
adopted a Law on Governing the Management of Oil Revenues, as part of its
project bid for the World Bank's financial support. 4 8 Chad agreed to retain this
Law without amendments or waivers that may materially or adversely affect the
implementation of the petroleum management revenue program. 49 The Law followed the obligations contained in the Loan Agreement and in accordance with
Article 2, oil revenues consist of direct and indirect resources; the former include
dividends and royalties, whereas the latter are comprised of taxes, fees, and customs duties related to oil exploration. Direct resources are to be allocated to priority sectors; particularly public health, social services, education, infrastructure,
rural development, environment, and water, 50 as follows: 80% is earmarked for
expenses related to priority sectors; 15% is intended for operating and investment
costs of the State for a five year period from the production date, and 5% is
5
intended for decentralised communities of the producing region. 1 In accordance
with Article 4 of the Law, all indirect resources shall be directly deposited into
the Public Treasury account. To safeguard against corruption, direct resources are
to be deposited into special accounts of an international financing institution as
offshore escrow accounts. 52
47

Id.

at art. 5(a).

48 Loi n*001/PR/99 du 11 janvier 1999 portant gestion des revenus pdtroliers [Law no. 001/PR/99 of
11 January 1999 governing management of petroleum revenues] [hereinafter Petroleum Revenue Management Law].
49 IBRD-Chad Loan Agreement, supra note 38, Sched. 5, art. .2.
50 Petroleum Revenue Management Law, supra note 48, at art. 7.
51 Id. at art. 8.
52 Id. at art. . 3.
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In March 2001, the only parliamentary opposition leader in Chad's Parliament
submitted a request for inspection to the World Bank's Inspection Panel. The
request alleged that the Pipeline Project constituted a threat to local communities
and their natural environment because of the absence or inadequacy of environmental assessment or compensation, further compounded by the lack of proper
consultation and disclosure to the affected communities. 53 The Panel observed
that institutional and human capacity building was insufficient to meet the project's social and environmental requirements and thus, Management was not in
compliance with its obligations. 54 Furthermore, the Panel reached the conclusion
that, although consultation with the local population satisfied formalities, it was
most often conducted in the presence of security forces and did not address the
needs of Chad's illiterate, rural population in the oil-producing fields. 55 The
Panel noted that the situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the country
lacked democratic governance and structures. 56
From an oversight point of view, Article 14 of the Law envisages the creation
of the CCSRP, with the aim of controlling the use of oil resources. The ninemember CCSRP is headed by the country director of the Bank of Central African
States and is composed of an additional five representatives from all three
branches of government, as well as four representatives from civil society. 57 According to Article 18 of the Law, the duties of the CCSRP are to verify that the
special accounts are in conformity with the Finance Law, and also to authorize
and control the disbursement of special accounts and allocation of funds. The
World Bank has provided $41 U.S. million in aid to develop a financial management information system, build a poverty database, improve the competence of
civil servants, and support the CCSRP. 58 Additionally, the Bank has appointed a
six-member independent International Advisory Group (IAG) whose mandate is
to advise the Bank and make information relating to poverty alleviation, management of oil revenues, and the involvement of civil society in the relevant projects
publicly available. 59
Despite the fact that this Law and the Loan Agreement constitute radical departures for the right to development and human rights in general, the Law is
subject to several limitations. As noted by the World Bank Inspection Panel, the
failure of Management to implement adequate institutional capacity building and
the lack of democratic governance does not ensure poverty reduction outcomes,
thereby requiring further "monitoring, review and assessment by an independent
53 World Bank Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-CameroonPetroleum and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) (July 17, 2002), ix [hereinafter
Chad-CameroonPipeline Report].

54 Id.

at 26.

55 Id. at 39-43.
56 Id. at 60-63.

57 Petroleum Revenue Management Law, supra note 48, at art. 16.
58 SVPTLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN On. WINDFA.LLS: WHO WHI BENEFrr? 42 (Robert Ebel ed., 2003).
59
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body such as the IAG." 60 This is of particular concern because bonuses and other
similar payments do not fall within the ambit of direct resources (and neither do
all the oil-producing units in the country). Therefore, they may be appropriated
by a unilateral act of the government, as was the case with a $25 U.S. million
signing bonus received in April 2000. After increased external pressure, the government disclosed that it had already committed $4.5 U.S. million of that amount
for arms expenditures and by October 2000, the Bank and the IMF wrote formally to the government explaining that if the remainder of the bonus was not
frozen and the CCSRP was not established immediately, neither of the two institutions would propose debt relief for Chad under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative (HIPC). The government took the required corrective measures in April 2001 and in May of that year, adopted a budgetary amendment
allocating 100 percent of the remaining bonus funds to priority expenditures
under the supervision of the CCSRP. 6 1
Other defects have also been cited in regards to Chad's implementation of the
trust fund. A significant defect is that the principles and mechanisms for the
62
allocation of five percent of revenues to the oil-producing region are undefined.
This is particularly problematic because one of the main causes of Chad's civil
strife is rooted in the rivalry between the Muslim North and the predominantly
Christian South, where the oil originates. 6 3 Although revenues should be utilized
to decrease poverty in the country as a whole, all case studies demonstrate, where
the oil-producing region is not part of the majority ethnic or religious group of
the country and, is furthermore not permitted to retain a significant portion of oil
revenues, some form of conflict is more than likely to follow. Another significant
problem with the Revenue Management Law is the fact that, in accordance with
its Article 8(2), the amount allocated to the priority sectors may be modified by
decree every five years depending on available resources, needs, and absorption
capacity of the region. It will be interesting to see if the government of Chad has
any intentions of altering the percentage of revenue allocation in the future and
whether the World Bank is inclined to put any pressure on the government in that
respect. If the allocation of resources takes place to the detriment of the country's
development process, the World Bank's position will significantly determine
similar processes in the future. According to credible commentators, since managing to get the project on its feet, the Bank now has no intention of getting
involved in ensuring the Revenue Management Law satisfies poverty reduction
targets.64
60 Chad-CameroonPipeline Report, supra note 53, at 81, 84.
61 World Bank, the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: Note on the Use
of the Petroleum Bonus, (June 2001), at 2, available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/
bonus.pdf>.
62 lAG, REPORT OF VisIT TO CHAD AND CAMEROON: APRIL 21 T1o MAY 10, 2003 18 (2003).
63 Uriz, supra note 36, at 215-219.
64 The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline:A New Model for Natural Resource Development: Hearing Before
the SubcommitteeSubcomm.Subcommittee on Africa of the CommitteeComm.Committee of Internation-

allnt'llnternationalRelations, 107th Cong. 37-52 (2002) (statement of Peter Rosenblum, Director,
Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School).

Volume 17, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

15

Effective Management of International Aid

3.2.

Trust Fund Lessons Learned from the Chad Experience

It is clear that the Revenue Management Law is, in itself, inadequate to address
poverty reduction. The Bank, participating States, and private investors must take
the same action as they did when they convinced Chad to adopt and adhere to the
Law. It is not hard to recognize that the main characteristics of the trust fund
model are missing from the vehicles designed by the World Bank and implemented in Chad's domestic law. The undiscerning reader will probably determine
that the existence of an independent external entity, endowed with the authority
to approve expenditures and revenue allocations, is tantamount to a veto against
the government's potential usurpation of the fund's assets. Equally, placing assets in private bank accounts with the belief their investments are in conformity
with the World Bank's approval seems to be an additional guaranteeing factor.
This, in fact, could not be further from the truth. For one thing, the vehicle and its
funding program were premised on a legislative act that was adopted by the borrower, and not on something that could have potentially been imposed by the
World Bank, irrespective of the fact that the borrower was not permitted to
amend the Law, save where it did not affect the objectives of the poverty reduction program. Secondly, the borrower unilaterally held and administered the assets of the fund. Although natural for future generations, funds held unilaterally
by developed States accountable to their local constituencies is wholly problematic for an authoritarian regime that is imbued with corruption and cronyism.
When such a borrower has access to the funds, as opposed to the funds being in
the ownership of the trustee, the borrower is constantly tempted to appropriate
parts of it. This is particularly true if the borrower invokes security concerns and
military exigencies. Unlike Chad's government, which made numerous exceptions, if the assets were held by an independent trustee, such as the World Bank,
no exception could be made. 65 Thus, the legal nature of the Future Generations
Fund of Chad was that of a sui generis sovereign wealth fund that was subject to
binding contractual, external, conditionalities. The same is equally true regarding
the Special Petroleum Revenue Accounts; which, despite its designation as an
Account in the Loan Agreement, is clearly an externally-imposed trust fund that
is subject to a special regime and intended primarily to tackle poverty.
Besides the signing bonus granted by the government of Chad in 2000, relevant reports demonstrate that the "fund" mechanism set up on the basis of the
Loan Agreement did not inhibit the government from appropriating large
amounts of money therefrom through a variety of tactics. In January 2006, President Deby adopted significant amendments to the Revenue Management Law, by
which he designated military expenditures as a priority sector, invoking urgent
security concerns. In the same manner, he increased the share of oil revenues for
discretionary government spending to 30 percent and abolished the Future Generations Fund. The World Bank responded by blocking the disbursement of a
planned loan of $124 U.S. million and by freezing the assets of the escrow acSee HANs ERIKSSON & BiORN HAGSTROMER, CHAD: TOWARDS DEMOCRATISATION OR PEPRO-DIc(2005), (history of the violations in relation to the management of the royalties and
dividends).
65

TATORSHIP?
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count in Citibank, London, that held the dividends and royalties of the Special
Petroleum Revenue Accounts. Faced with a complete breakdown in bilateral relations and the prospect of abandonment of a major project that was well underway, the World Bank finally entered into a memorandum of understanding with
the government of Chad on July 16, 2006. According to the memorandum of
understanding, Chad was to commit 70 percent of proceeds to priority poverty
reduction programs, in addition to setting aside assets for the purpose of establishing a stabilisation fund. Furthermore, it was agreed that the existing obligation to earmark five percent of proceeds for the oil-producing regions was to
remain intact. 66
The official implementation completion report (ICR) of the World Bank on the
management of the petroleum economy project was not favorable, 6 7 and according to most NGOs monitoring the project, the ICR paints a far more complimentary picture than reality would suggest. In fairness, the World Bank had the right
intentions and drew up a powerful agreement, clad with what seems like an efficient oversight mechanism and without surrendering full decision-making authority to the borrower on the use of the trust's contributed assets. Nevertheless, this
trust model runs contrary to the basic and foundational characteristics underlying
all the trust funds analyzed in this book. First of all, the absence of an independent trustee that actually held the assets in trust ownership meant the borrower
could appropriate them at any time; even if it constituted a violation of the terms
of the Loan Agreement. Second, the fact that the terms of the trust fund could be
amended unilaterally by the borrower, even if not obvious or substantially, meant
that they were subject to the borrower's individual circumstances, including force
majeure. Third, the application in the particular circumstances of an expanded
interpretation of the local ownership principle, whereby the borrower was to
identify the poverty reduction priority areas, as well as other needs as specified in
the agreement, was clearly wrong. The government of Chad should no doubt
have been given increased voting power, but this should have been counterweighted by the existence of a decision-making mechanism comprised of the
trustee, the oversight committee, representatives of civil society, and perhaps
others. If for no other reason, this mechanism would have ensured that the borrower was constrained to act within the parameters of the agreement and that the
existence of a precise and active role for civil society would be acknowledged
and respected. None of this has taken place. It is safe to say that the Bank's good
intentions were simply insufficient.
4.

Conclusion

In its final report on the Chadian mechanism, the World Bank admitted that
while the operational aspects of the project were largely successful, the develop66 John A. Gould & Matthew S. Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in Leverage between the Government and the World Bank, 9 Bus. & POL. 1, 27-28 (2007).
67 THE WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (PPFI-Q1990 IDA-33160) ON A
CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 12.6 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD FOR A MANAGEMENT OF THE
PETROLEUM ECONOMY PROJECT, 7 (2006).
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mental aims were not. 68 Following the Millennium Summit, the U.N. SecretaryGeneral finalized the text of the eight agreed Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs): (1) eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achievement of universal primary education; (3) promotion of gender equality and empowerment of
women; (4) reduction of child mortality; (5) improvement of maternal health; (6)
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental
sustainability; and (8) establishment of a global partnership for development. Industrialized states pledged to contribute 0.7 percent of their GDP 69 to meet these
targets and, in addition, undertook to support exports from least developed nations, offer debt relief by cancelling all official bilateral debts in return for demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction, and provided generous
development assistance. 70 The achievement of the first seven substantive goals is
predicated to a large degree on goal eight, which seeks to develop a global partnership for development through the delivery of official development assistance
(ODA), debt relief, tariff and quota-free access, and making available essential
drugs and new technologies. Thus, ODA, which consists of direct financial assistance, is complementary to other initiatives and requires that the target state is
obliged to work towards implementing the targets and indicators of the MDGs.
Paragraph 39 of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus7 1 makes it clear that ODA is
reserved for countries with the least capacity of attracting foreign direct investment. Its purpose is to help achieve:
adequate levels of domestic resource mobilisation over an appropriate
time horizon, while human capital, productive and export capacities are
enhanced. ODA can be critical for improving the environment for private
sector activity and can thus pave the way for robust growth. ODA is also
a crucial instrument for supporting education, health, public infrastructure
development, agriculture and rural development and to enhance food
security.

It is broadly understood that development financing is the main mechanism to
achieve the SDGs. It is therefore imperative that any financing framework possess the following characteristics: be rights-sensitive and considered against
human rights' standards and indicators (e.g., removal of tied aid); avoid overly
technocratic goals that provide good statistical reading and instead focus on
transforming the lives of people by prioritizing human rights in policy choices
and resource allocation; aim to empower all people and disrupt unequal power
68 THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM OF SUPPORT FOR THE CHAD-CAMEROON
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE CONSTRUCTLON, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

(2009).
69 Int'l Conference on Financing for Dev., Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, 1
42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 198/11 (March 18-22, 2002).
70 G.A. Res. 55/2, 11 15-18 (Sept. 18, 2000); U.N. Millennium Declaration Goal 8: Develop a
Global Partnership for Dev., https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml.
71 Int'l Conference on Financing for Dev., supra note 69, at ¶ 39. The Monterey Consensus is a
political declaration of the highest calibre aimed at mobilising development assistance, international trade
as an engine for development and eliminating external debt. It was followed up in 2008 by the Doha
Declaration on Financing for Development, Id.
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relations that thwart development for the masses; and make MDG rights justiciable-not necessarily against the donors, but in respect of the institutions and
mechanisms set up by target states. 7 2 Only independent oversight mechanisms,
which bypass official channels of the target state, can ensure that the benefits of
aid, through a human rights-based process, can be realized.
Indeed, independent trust funds ensure not only that the process is human
rights-based, but that the end outcomes are in line with fundamental human rights
and the SDGs. Human rights are now an integral part of the international development finance framework. Human rights are embedded in the new financing for
development framework as set out in the third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa. Respect for all human rights underlies
3
states' commitments under the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA)7 -which
74
pledges to provide a social protection floor for everyone and lays emphasis on
development actors' accountability in relation to their financing promises that are
subject to review for the first time.75 Besides, the equitable distribution of resources so that all persons have their most basic needs met, human rights are a
key objective for the AAAA 76 which, in this regard, aims to establish an international development financing system that is just, cooperative, transparent, and
premised on human rights standards.77

72 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development, 3, DCD/DAC/15 (Feb. 15, 2007); Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], DAC Evaluating Development Cooperation: Summary of Key
Norms and Standards, 13-14 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdcdep/
41612905.pdf.).
73 G.A. Res. 69/313, 1 1 (July 27, 2015).
74

Id. at 1 12.

11 130-34.
76 That human rights considerations should permeate development finance programs was raised by
the OHCHR during the third international conference on financing for development and the negotiations
of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), its outcome document. It was emphasized that the objective
of financing development should be the equitable distribution of resources so that all persons have their
most basic needs met and human rights are made a reality for all. SSU.N.See Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Key. Messages on Financing for Development
and Human Rights (2015), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/KeyMessageHRFinancingDevelopment.pdf.
77 Civil society denies that this holds true. On the same note, civil society expressed skepticism about
the new financing framework to achieve Agenda 2030 for sustainable development, stating that although
the AAAA promulgates the realignment of financial flows with public goals, the agenda does not tackle
the structural injustices in the current economic system and that development finance is not peoplecentered. See Addis Ababa, Civil Society Response to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financingfor
Development, Global Policy Watch (July 16, 2015), https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/20150716-CSO-Response-to-FfD-Addis-Ababa-Action-Agenda.pdf.
75 Id. at
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